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MAKING MISTAKES WITH MACHINES
By Harsimar Dhanoa
As adoption of machine-executed smart contracts increases, so
too does the risk that the machines underlying these agreements will
deviate from the intentions of the contracting parties. While contract
law allows a narrow opportunity for setting aside of a contract under
the doctrine of mistake, the application of this doctrine is muddied
when the machines entirely operate within the confines of their
programming. This paper highlights two notable instances of such
deviation, the flash crash of 2010 and the 2016 attack on the
blockchain project, the DAO, before focusing on the first case to
address the doctrine of mistake in the context of these smart contracts:
the Singaporean case of B2C2 Ltd v. Quoine Pte Ltd. While the
Singapore International Commercial Court and the Court of Appeal of
Singapore, the country’s highest court, reached the correct solution,
this paper argues that the Singaporean courts incorrectly limited
themselves to only considering the knowledge and intentions of the
programmer behind the smart contracts. Further, the paper suggests
that a threshold inquiry offered by the American Restatement (2d) on
Contracts may help to establish when a party using a smart contract
has assumed the risks associated with its execution.
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INTRODUCTION
Freedom of contract is fundamental to modern contract law.
The principle balances on one hand, parties’ rights to bind themselves
legally, even where the agreement “may not seem desirable or pleasant
to outside observers,” whether they range from mowing a lawn for a
paltry sum or enabling a multi-million-dollar merger.1 On the other
hand, the principle requires parties to accept a possible bad bargain
without court interference.2 However, to quote Alexander Pope, “to err
is human.”3 While courts have not been so divine as to forgive such
mistakes entirely, both English and American contract law allow for
the rescission of some contracts under the doctrine of mistake. This
doctrine traditionally has been narrow, reflecting both a concern that
parties feeling disappointed in their deal may concoct mistakes after
the fact and a recognition that the avoidance of mistakes is “precisely
the quality which marks the successful and efficient businessmen.”4
Thus, for courts whose “primary goal in interpreting contracts is to
determine and enforce the parties’ intent,” when should mistake be
accounted for and on what grounds?5
While the task of remedying mistakes is complex among
humans alone, the increasing role of machines in the formation and
execution of contracts presents an additional wrinkle to resolve.
Imagine the following scenario: Hunter, a computer programmer, turns
to their spouse, Dakota, and says, “I’m heading to the store. Any
requests?” Dakota responds “Pick up a loaf of bread. If they have eggs,
pick up a dozen.” With Dakota’s instructions in tow, Hunter goes to the
store and returns an hour later with thirteen loaves of bread in hand.
Upon seeing the loaves, an exasperated Dakota asks, “Why’d you buy
so much bread?” In response, Hunter simply says: “They had eggs.”
While legal scholars may disagree on how Hunter should have
interpreted Dakota’s ambiguous instructions, in the eyes of a machine
(or at the least, a computer programmer thinking like a machine), the
instructions are incredibly clear. Computers are exacting textualists
that dutifully obey their instructions, even where those instructions

1

Guiliano v. Cleo, Inc., 995 S.W.2d 88, 100 (Tenn. 1999).
Id., see also CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF
CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 113 (1981) ("If we take autonomy seriously as a
principle for ordering human affairs . . . people must abide by the
consequences of their choices . . .").
3
ALEXANDER POPE, AN ESSAY ON CRITICISM 30 (1711).
4
P.B.H. BIRKS, THE ROMAN LAW OF OBLIGATIONS 76–77 (2014).
5
Old Kent Bank v. Sobczak, 243 Mich.App. 57, 63 (2000).
2
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deviate from the programmer’s intent.6 As a result, Hunter’s actions
appear absurd in the context of a person interpreting Dakota’s
instructions and yet perfectly reasonable in the context of a computer
attempting to do the same.
As “smart contracts” become increasingly more common, the
significance of the disconnect between the ways that humans and
machines understand language magnifies.7 In turn, courts, which are
well versed in the application of contract doctrine to traditional
contracts, will need to apply this doctrine in the context of these smart
contracts.8 More specifically, courts will need to resolve the tension
that exists when a computer’s execution of an agreement is in line with
the objective programming of the smart contract, but not in line with
the subjective intents of one of the parties to the contract. For example,
if Dakota sought to reverse the purchase of the additional dozen loaves,
how should a court reconcile the competing objective and subjective
views of contract in the context of her smart contract? And if the court
decides that Dakota is bound to the purchase of the additional loaves,
what measures might ensure that future parties relying on smart
contracts are mindful of the risks?
This paper seeks to explore these questions in the context of
B2C2 Ltd v. Quoine Pte Ltd, a decision of first impression in which the
Singapore International Commercial Court (SICC) analyzed the
doctrine of mistake in the context of an algorithmic trading contract on
a cryptocurrency exchange, and its subsequent affirmation by
Singapore’s highest court.9 These decisions provide the first
opportunity to analyze how courts in practice assess the contours of the
contract doctrine of mistake in light of smart contracts. In reviewing
these decisions, this paper builds on previous work to explore the
6
In fact, interpreting Dakota’s instructions literally, Hunter would have never
returned home, having never been told to do so. Instead, they would have stood
in the grocery store for eternity after having physically picked up the bread.
7
While some scholars use the term “smart contract” to refer to agreements
that utilize “blockchain” or distributed ledger technology, for the purposes of
this paper, the term refers to a broader category of agreements whose
formation and/or execution is automated, often “through a computer running
code that has translated the [human language] legal prose into an executable
program.” See MAX RASKIN, THE LAW AND LEGALITY OF SMART
CONTRACTS, 1 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 305, 309 (2017).
8
See, e.g., Mark Giancaspro, Is a 'Smart Contract' Really a Smart Idea?
Insights from a Legal Perspective, 33 COMPUT. L. & SEC. REV. 825, 835
(2017) ("It is not yet entirely clear whether smart contracts are a smart idea,
but there is little doubt the question will soon be tested in the courts.").
9
See generally B2C2 Ltd v. Quoine Pte Ltd [2019] SGHC(I) 03, aff’d Quoine
Pte Ltd v. B2C2 Ltd [2020] SGCA(I) 02.
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disagreements between the SICC and Singapore’s highest court, and to
suggest that a threshold inquiry imported from American contract law
to identify when the doctrine of mistake should be available to parties
using smart contracts and when they instead have undertaken the risk
of that outcome.
Part I provides a background to the rise of machine-executed
smart contracts, using J.G. Allen’s model of the contract stack to
provide a comparison to traditional contracts. Part I additionally
highlights four applications of these agreements and subsequent
instances where the machine’s execution diverged from the parties’
intentions. Part II begins with the factual background of the dispute
between B2C2 Ltd. and Quoine and discusses the Singapore
International Commercial Court’s application of the mistake doctrine
as well as the subsequent decision to deny rescission, its affirmation by
Singapore’s highest court and compares the application of American
contract common law. Part III discusses the implications of the B2C2
decision and whether the doctrine of mistake should treat machineexecuted contracts differently.
I.

BACKGROUND
A. The Rise of Machine-Executed Smart Contracts

The interaction between the natural language used by humans
and the formal language used by machines is not new. Rather, the use
of machines to form and execute contracts goes back nearly half a
century.10 However, as technology enables greater machine autonomy,
computers increasingly operate not only as the mediums of
communication for humans seeking to contract. Instead, these
machines also act as active instruments in allowing parties to contract.
As the technology develops further and becomes more sophisticated,
computers may be able to act autonomously in forming contracts,
requiring little to no human input as they negotiate complex terms
beyond just price.11 Because of their analytical sophistication, smart

10

Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) systems—automated digital
communications between or within firms—have been around since the 1970s.
While the scope of these systems goes beyond contracting electronic
communication, they facilitate particular types of contracts, such as purchase
orders. See generally JANE K. WINN & BENJAMIN WRIGHT, LAW OF
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE § 5-09 (4th ed. 2001).
11
See generally Samir Chopra & Laurence White, Artificial Agents and the
Contracting Problem: A Solution Via an Agency Analysis, 2009 U. ILL. J.L.
TECH. & POL’Y 363 (2009). While some scholars raise questions as to
application of contract law to artificially intelligent machines that extend this
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contracts can process a vast amount of data thanks to advances in data
collection and storage.12 Moreover, advances in processing speed allow
machines to achieve a level of sophistication that would otherwise be
impractical for humans to perform given the time and effort required.13
Scholar J.G. Allen’s model of the contract stack illustrates the
parallels between traditional contracts and their “smart” equivalents.14
The model utilizes the idea of a “software stack”—a set of software
and hardware subsystems that are needed to implement a fully
functional computing solution.15 In computing, a simplified solution
stack consists of the application as well as the programming
environment, data management layer, operating system, and hardware
platform.16 With a “paper” contract, the contract is similarly comprised
of multiple layers: “(i) the spoken words through which the contractual
terms were negotiated and against which the text was drafted, (ii) the
written text, and (iii) legal rules implying terms and governing
construction.”17 Depending on the nature of the agreement, this second
layer is often highly complex as the layer of legal rules generally
excludes the consideration of “off-contract” materials, such as precontract negotiations, with limited exception.18 In a smart contract, the
written text codifying the parties’ intentions is complemented (or in
some instances fully replaced) by machine-executable code.19
Depending on the design and nature of the agreement, this code layer
may cover some to all of the contract as a whole.20 This model
highlights that modern smart contracts remain “wrapped” in a
traditional contractual framework given the relationship between the
contract’s written instruments and its digital ones.21

active role to be able to independently contract absent any humans, such issues
are beyond the scope of this paper.
12
See Michal S. Gal & Niva Elkin-Koren, Algorithmic Consumers, 30 HARV.
J. LAW & TECH. 309, 318–19 (2017).
13
Id. at 318.
14
See generally J.G. Allen, Wrapped and Stacked: “Smart Contracts” and the
Interaction of Natural and Formal Language, 14 EUR. REV. CONT. L. 307
(2018).
15
Bettina Hein, 0+0=1: The Appliance Model of Selling Software Bundled
with Hardware 17–18 (May 11, 2007) (unpublished M.S. thesis,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology) (on file with author).
16
Id.
17
Allen, supra note 14, at 331.
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Id.
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Figure 1. Comparison of the elements of a traditional contract and those of a
smart contract under J.G. Allen's contract stack theory.

B. Breakdowns in the Contract Stack
Two applications of smart contracts include high frequency
trading, and distributed organizations.
1. High Frequency Trading
One widespread application of machine-executed smart
contracts is their use in high frequency trading. While no one universal
or legal definition of high frequency trading exists, the term generally
refers to the trading of financial instruments, such as securities and
derivatives through the use of supercomputers with the capability to
execute trades within microseconds or milliseconds.22 High frequency
trading thus works as a smart contract whereby the algorithmic code is
used for “decision making, order initiation, generation, routing, or
execution, for each individual transaction without human direction.”23
By trading hundreds or thousands of times per day, traders that use high
frequency trading are able to profit by aggregating small amounts of
profit per trade, often in the magnitude of fractions of a cent.24 Over the
past decade, the use of high frequency trading has grown significantly.
Within the U.S., it accounts for approximately 55% of the equity
market trading volume and about 40% in European equity markets.25
22
RENA S. MILLER & GARY SHORT, CONG. RESEARCH. SERV, R44443, HIGH
FREQUENCY TRADING: OVERVIEW OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 1 (2016),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44443.pdf.
23
Id.
24
Id. at 2, 4 n.14.
25
Austin Gerig, High-Frequency Trading Synchronizes Prices in Financial
Markets 1 (Jan. 21, 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission, Division of Economic and Risk

104

SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J.

[Vol. 37

Algorithmic trading programs generally influence the trading decisions
of as many as seventy percent of the securities transactions executed in
the United States.26
However, high frequency trading is not without its risks, as it
can unintentionally contribute to market volatility in times of stress.
The most notable example of this is the flash crash of 2010, during
which the Dow Jones Industrial Average dropped by nine percent and
millions of dollars were lost in the span of minutes.27 While the official
report issued by the joint advisory committee, comprised of staff from
both the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) and the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), investigating the crash
did not explicitly attribute the crash to high frequency traders, it did
find that the algorithm of a non-high frequency traded mutual fund sold
nearly a tenth of its previous volume as a hedge against unusually high
volatility in the market.28 The execution of the algorithmic sell contract
resulted in the largest net change in daily position of any trader in the
E-Mini S&P 500 futures contracts market since the beginning of the
year.29 While the high frequency traders initially absorbed the
downward pressure caused by this sale, they eventually aggressively
sold their contracts, increasing the rate at which the mutual fund sold
its position.30 According to a report on the flash crash, “[a]s time
passed, the aggressiveness only increased, with these violent selling
events occurring more often, until finally the e-Mini circuit breaker
kicked in and paused trading for 5 seconds, ending the market slide.”31
While the flash crash occurred in a regulated securities market,
not all high frequency trading occurs in such venues. Dark pools are
alternative trading systems that permit the trading of securities listed
on national securities exchanges as well as “off-exchange,” or unlisted
securities without any disclosure of the trading information required on

Analysis), https://www.sec.gov/dera/staff-papers/working-papers/dera-wphft-synchronizes.html.
26
See Michael Mackenzie, High-Frequency Trading Under Scrutiny, FIN.
TIMES (July 28, 2009), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/d5fa0660-7b95-11de9772-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3kPGSbBkJ.
27
CTFC & SEC, FINDINGS REGARDING THE MARKET EVENTS OF MAY 6,
2010, 1–4 (Sept. 30, 2010),
https://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2010/marketevents-report.pdf.
28
Id. at 2.
29
Id.
30
May 6’th 2010 Flash Crash Analysis, NANEX (Oct. 14, 2010),
http://www.nanex.net/FlashCrashFinal/FlashCrashAnalysis_Theory.html.
31
Id.
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nationally regulated exchanges.32 As of April 2020, there are over fifty
dark pools in operation.33 While the SEC’s Regulation ATS imposed
some rules on these dark pools, the regulation lowers the standard of
applicable regulation compared to national securities exchange if the
alternative trading system complies with the Regulations reporting
requirements.34
Like with the initial hypothetical with Hunter and Dakota, the
performance of the high frequency trading programs highlights how
machines, while dutifully following their coding, can lead to disastrous
results. While such issues may have never arisen if only one algorithm
was in place, the features that make smart contracts used for high
frequency trading—their speed and their analytical sophistication—
meant that their sensitivity to market forces created economic
resonance that affected the market in ways that the traders behind the
high frequency trading never intended.
2. Decentralized Organizations
Another application of smart contracts is the use of distributed
ledger technology as a centralized platform to create decentralized
organizations.35 One of the most prominent examples of such a
decentralized organization is the DAO, a decentralized autonomous
organization programmed by the German startup Slock.it.36 Having
raised more than $160 million from more than 10,000 people globally,
the DAO operated on the same technology that drives Bitcoin.37
However, rather than operate as a cryptocurrency, the DAO’s purpose
was to effectively be a venture capital firm that raises funds for projects
run on the Ethereum blockchain—the leading blockchain-based
platform for smart contracts—and then to disperse the funds based on
32
Kristin N. Johnson, Regulating Innovation: High Frequency Trading in
Dark Pools, 42 J. CORP. L. 833, 864 (2017).
33
SEC, ALTERNATIVE TRADING SYSTEMS WITH FORM ATS ON FILE WITH
THE SEC AS OF APRIL 30, 2020 (Apr. 30, 2020),
https://www.sec.gov/files/node/add/data_distribution/atslist043020.pdf.
34
See Regulation of Exchanges and Alternative Trading System, Exchange
Act Release No. 34-40760, 63 Fed. Reg. 245 (Dec. 11, 1998) (providing
alternative trading systems with a choice in regulatory treatment as an
exchange or as a broker-dealer).
35
See generally, e.g., Laila Metjahic, Deconstructing the DAO: The Need for
Legal Recognition and the Application of Securities Laws to Decentralized
Organizations, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 1533 (2018).
36
See id. at 1534; David Siegel, Understanding the DAO Attack, COINDESK
(June 25, 2016), https://www.coindesk.com/understanding-dao-hackjournalists.
37
Metjahic, supra note 35, at 1534.
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its members’ votes.38 Ultimately, it contained roughly fifteen percent
of all ether on the Ethereum network.39 Like with corporations that rely
on a set of bylaws that guide how shareholders, employees, and the
board of the directors interact with one another, the DAO relied on a
set of smart contracts that encoded the bylaws of the organization.40
However, despite its name, the DAO was not a true decentralized
autonomous organization as it still depended on human involvement.41
Unfortunately, the smart contracts that powered the DAO
proved to be its undoing. Shortly after the DAO’s funding period
closed, one of the DAO’s creators announced a vulnerability that was
common to all Ethereum smart contracts, as well as a fix that was meant
to prevent the vulnerability from being used to drain funds from the
DAO.42 At the time, more than fifty project proposals were waiting to
be voted on, but the blog post reiterated that “no DAO funds [were] at
risk.”43 However, less than a week later, an attacker used the
supposedly-fixed vulnerability in combination with the inherent
functionality of the DAO’s smart contracts.44 First, the vulnerability
allowed the attacker to send ether to the DAO’s smart contract, which
triggered the smart contract to add the ether to its balance using an
addToBalance function.45 Next, the hacker withdrew the same amount
of currency, which first triggered the smart contract to disperse the
38
See Nathaniel Popper, A Hacking of More Than $50 Million Dashes Hopes
in the World of Virtual Currency, N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/18/business/dealbook/hacker-may-haveremoved-more-than-50-million-from-experimental-cybercurrencyproject.html.
39
Siegel, supra note 36.
40
See Obrea Poindexter & Temidayo O. Odusolu, Code-Based Fund - the
Future of Startup Funding, LAW360 (Aug. 10, 2016, 12:55 PM),
https://www.law360.com/privateequity/articles/826986/code-based-fund-thefuture-of-startup-funding.
41
See Metjahic, supra note 35, at 1544.
42
Stephan Tual, No DAO Funds at Risk Following the Ethereum Smart
Contract ‘Recursive Call’ Bug Discovery, SLOCK.IT BLOG (June 12, 2016),
https://blog.slock.it/no-dao-funds-at-risk-following-the-ethereum-smartcontract-recursive-call-bug-discovery-29f482d348b#.mbfqikiyo.
43
See id.; Siegel, supra note 36.
44
See Maria P. Gomez Gelvez, Explaining the DAO Exploit for Beginners in
Solidity, MEDIUM (Oct. 16, 2016),
https://medium.com/@MyPaoG/explaining-the-dao-exploit-for-beginners-insolidity-80ee84f0d470. For a more detailed discussion of the multi-stage
attack, see generally Phil Daian, Analysis of the DAO Exploit, HACKING
DISTRIBUTED (June 18, 2016),
https://hackingdistributed.com/2016/06/18/analysis-of-the-dao-exploit/.
45
Gelvez, supra note 44.
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ether using the withdrawBalance function before updating the smart
contract’s balance.46 This order of operations, combined with the
previously-discovered vulnerability, allowed the attacker to repeatedly
request to withdraw the ether before the smart contract ever updated its
balances.47
In response, nearly ninety percent of individuals with voting
rights voted to implement a hard fork in the DAO’s protocol. This hard
fork split the Etherium network into two chains.48 On one chain, which
kept the original Ethereum name, a new smart contract was created that
would allow the initial investors to withdraw their initial investments.49
On the other unforked version, entitled Ethereum Class, the attacker
received the funds.50 The decision to implement a hard fork led to
controversy as it required the violation of the immutability principle of
the distributed ledger technology underlying the DAO.51
Interestingly, the attacker also opined on whether a hard fork
was appropriate after the attack, noting that they had “carefully
examined the code of The DAO and decided to participate after finding
the feature where splitting is rewarded with additional ether. I have
made use of this feature and have rightfully claimed 3,641,694 ether,
and would like to thank the DAO for this reward.”52 The attacker
opposed the term “theft,” instead highlighting that their actions made
use of explicitly coded features within the smart contract—code which
was described as “control[ling] and sett[ing] forth all terms of the DAO
Creation.”53 Thus, the attacker claimed that a soft or hard fork would
amount to an unlawful seizure of the attacker’s “legitimate and rightful
ether, claimed legally through the terms of a smart contract” and they
reserved “all rights to take any and all legal action against any
accomplices of illegitimate theft, freezing, or seizure of my legitimate
ether.”54 However, nothing came of the attacker’s threats of legal
action.
The DAO highlights again the complicated relationship
between the terms of the smart contract as implemented in the code
46

Id.
Id.
48
Ben Kaufman, The DAO Hack — Stolen $50M & The Hard Fork, MEDIUM:
CYPTOCURRENCY HUB (Apr. 21, 2018), https://cryptocurrencyhub.io/the-daohack-stolen-50m-the-hard-fork-8719fb5f28be.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
See generally An Open Letter, PASTEBIN (June 18, 2016),
https://pastebin.com/CcGUBgDG.
53
Id.
54
See id.
47
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itself and the expectations of the parties who contributed funds to the
project. On one hand, the attack did not require rewriting or changing
the terms of the initial DAO smart contract, but merely interacting with
the existing code such that it produced the response that the attacker
wanted. Conversely, however, the response the attacker wanted—
repeatedly withdrawing funds from the DAO’s coffers—was not
within the realm of possibilities that they had intended to produce. If
the attacker had followed through on his threat of legal action, one can
only begin to imagine how a court would struggle to detangle these
threads especially where, unlike in other smart contracts, the code of
the DAO fully replaced any natural language agreements that would
offer additional interpretative guidance.
II.

THE DISPUTE BETWEEN B2C2 AND QUOINE

The threads of high frequency trading and the DAO converge
in the dispute between B2C2 and Quoine. Quoine, a Singaporeincorporated company, operated a currency exchange platform which
allowed third parties to trade Bitcoin and Ethereum “for other virtual
currencies or for fiat currencies such as Singapore or US dollars.”55 All
traders entered into an agreement with the platform owner, Quoine, in
order to trade on the platform.56 Quoine offered three types of trading
on its platform: spot trading, where trades are settled instantly; margin
trading, where traders can trade using borrowed funds; and futures
trading, where the traders agree to sell at a future date at a given price.57
For traders engaged in margin trading, the trader could source the
borrowed funds from Quoine itself or from other users on the platform
who offered their funds for peer-to-peer loans, with the assets in the
margin trader’s accounts serving as collateral.58 If the collateral in the
account fell below a pre-determined percentage of the loan, the
platform would automatically make a margin call and would close out
all or part of the margin trader’s position in an attempt to prevent
further loss and ultimately a default.59 Additionally, Quoine operated
as a market maker on its platform, using its “quoter program” to source
prices from other exchanges, akin in some ways to high frequency
trading.60 Similarly, B2C2 was an electronic market maker
incorporated in England.61 While B2C2’s software normally evaluates
55

B2C2 Ltd v. Quoine Pte Ltd [2019] SGHC(I) 03 at 10 (Sing.).
Id. at 10.
57
Id. at 7.
58
Id.
59
Id. at 8.
60
Id. at 5–6.
61
B2C2 Ltd [2019] SGHC(I) 03 at 1.
56
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the first twenty market prices and calculates an appropriate price to
trade at, the software maintains a fail-safe price of 10 bitcoin to one
ether when there is insufficient market data.62
A. The April 19th Reversal
On April 13, 2017, Quoine made changes to several login
passwords made earlier in the week for security reasons, but did not
make necessary changes to its quoter program.63 As a result, the quoter
program was unable to access data from other exchanges and stopped
creating new bitcoin/ether orders on the platform.64 Over the next few
days, existing orders on the bitcoin/ether order book were matched with
customer orders, leading to the eventual depletion of the platform’s
order book.65
On April 19th, two margin traders were trading in the
Ethereum/Bitcoin market using ether borrowed from Quoine.66 Despite
having insufficient bitcoin to maintain their position, the depletion of
the bitcoin/ether order book led the platform, which had no separate
program to check if a trader had sufficient available assets, to calculate
that the margin traders’ positions were in a “margin sell-out position,”
which served to trigger margin calls and the placement of orders to buy
ether at the best available price on the platform.67 Within a half hour,
the only remaining orders belonged to B2C2, priced at its fail-safe price
of 10 bitcoin to 1 ether, even though this was 250 times the going rate
of the previous existing orders.68
The next day, Quoine became aware of the trades and
“considered the exchange rate to be such a highly abnormal deviation
from the previous going rate that the trades should be reversed.”69 As a
result, Quoine cancelled B2C2’s trades and reversed the debit and
credit transactions.70 Subsequently, B2C2 filed suit against Quoine,
asserting that the unilateral cancellation of the trades constituted breach
of contract of the agreement required of all traders seeking to trade on
the platform.71 Quoine argued that it was entitled to reverse the trades

62

Id. at 33–34.
Id.
64
Id. at 27.
65
Id. at 28.
66
Id. at 12.
67
B2C2 Ltd [2019] SGHC(I) 03 at 28–29.
68
See id. at 2, 32.
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
Id. at 53.
63
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on the basis that its contracts with B2C2 were void under the doctrine
of unilateral mistake at common law.72
B. Applying Unilateral Mistake
Under Singaporean law, to render a contract void under the
common law doctrine of unilateral mistake, a party must show that it
acted while operating under a mistake of a fundamental term of the
contract and that the non-mistaken party had actual knowledge of the
mistaken party’s error.73 Additionally, the doctrine of unilateral
mistake in equity substitutes the non-mistaken party’s actual
knowledge with constructive knowledge and also requires the mistaken
party to show that the non-mistaken party engaged in unconscionable
conduct in relation to the mistake in order to establish that the contract
is voidable.74 Because of the lack of any human intervention in the
formation and execution of the contracts, the primary issue became
whose knowledge was to be assessed as to the mistake, raising the
following questions: “What mistakes have been made and to what
extent are they fundamental? How does the Court assess knowledge or
intention when the operation is carried out by computers acting as
programmed? Whose knowledge is relevant? At what date is
knowledge to be assessed?”75
As a threshold matter, the SICC rejected Quoine’s argument
that the court should approach these questions as if the parties had met
on the “floor of the exchange” when executing the trades at issue.76
Instead, the SICC noted that the parties chose intentionally to use
computers as their means of trading and that in doing so, were aware
that no human element was involved.77 The SICC concluded that the
mistake must be a mistake by the person on whose behalf the computer
placed the order, and that the mistake must be in existence on or prior
to the time of the trades.78
Quoine argued that B2C2 had actual or at least constructive
knowledge of the margin traders’ mistaken belief that they were buying
ether for bitcoin at prices which accurately represented or at least did
not deviate significantly from the true market value because B2C2’s
use of the fail-safe price of 10 bitcoin for 1 ether was set to allow it to
unconscionably profit from potential errors of the other market
72

Id. at 54.
B2C2 Ltd [2019] SGHC(I) 03 at 77.
74
Id. at 82, 83.
75
Id. at 86.
76
Id.
77
Id. at 86–87.
78
Id.
73

2021]

MISTAKES WITH MACHINES

111

participants.79 While the SICC held that price was a fundamental term
of the agreement, on appeal, Singapore’s highest court disagreed,
instead characterizing the mistaken belief as a “mistaken assumption
on the part of the Counterparties as to how the Platform would operate”
because the prices of the disputed trades were determined by the
parties’ respective algorithms.80 Thus, while the margin traders may
have been mistaken in their assumptions about the circumstances under
which the trades would be completed, the fundamental term at issue—
price—was not mistaken.81
While the SICC and Singapore’s highest court disagreed as to
whether the mistaken belief went to a fundamental term of the trades,
they both agreed that B2C2 did not have actual or constructive
knowledge of the margin traders’ mistaken belief.82 In attempting to
address whose knowledge was central to the inquiry, the SICC adopted
Quoine’s argument that it consider what the programmer of the
software in question would have known and intended when writing the
software.83 The court, attempting to limit its decision to the facts of the
case, noted that while it did not intend to express any views on the legal
relationship between computers and those who control or program
them, the programs in the present case were entirely deterministic in
that they “do and only do what they have been programmed to do,”
akin to “a kitchen blender relieving a cook of the manual act of mixing
ingredients.”84 Thus, the SICC held that when determining the
intention or knowledge underlying a machine’s mode of operation, the
court ought to turn to the operator or controller of the machine.85 In
doing so, it inquired as to whether the programmer had actual
knowledge that other traders believed that “in no circumstances would
a trade be transacted on the Platform at prices which deviated
substantially from the actual market prices . . . .”86 Finding that the
programmer foresaw a number of factors which might cause the
program to lack adequate pricing information and thus rely on the failsafe price, the court determined that his intention of including the failsafe price was because of his knowledge of the possibility of trades at
79
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that price being executed.87 Because the programmer did not have this
actual knowledge, the SICC extrapolated and held that he could not
have had actual knowledge that other traders on the platform had this
belief.88 Accordingly, the SICC rejected Quoine’s unilateral mistake at
common law defense.89
With regard to its unilateral mistake in equity defense, the
SICC held that the programmer did not “turn a blind eye to that which
would have been obvious to everyone else in his position,” especially
given his rationale and motivation for inserting the fail-safe price.90
Further, the SICC noted that there was no unconscionability in the
programmer’s actions, and that while they may have been an
“opportunistic” business position to ensure that what would otherwise
be an unlikely event was not necessarily an unlikely loss, it was not
sinister.91 Thus, the SICC similarly rejected Quoine’s unilateral
mistake in equity defense.92
C. Evaluating the B2C2 Decision
While it is not surprising that what appears to be the first case
of the doctrine of mistake in the context of a smart contracts would
emerge from Singapore, a jurisdiction with a reputation for embracing
new technologies,93 the question remains: did Singapore reach the right
decision? While the court reached the correct result, it incorrectly
limited its inquiry to the knowledge and intentions of the programmer,
the overall outcome is consistent with American contract law.
The SICC’s tailoring of its inquiry to solely focus on the
knowledge and motivations of the programmer behind B2C2’s price
algorithm is concerning in its exclusion of the knowledge and
motivation of B2C2 itself.94 In reaching the decision to inquire into the
programmer’s state of mind, the SICC concedes that “[t]he knowledge
or intention cannot be that of the person who turns it on, it must be that
of the person who was responsible for causing it to work in the way it
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did.”95 However, in applying this principle, the SICC incorrectly limits
itself only to the programmer. Read narrowly as the Singapore courts
did, this limitation does not necessarily comply with the reality of the
relationship between the programmer and the contracting party and
where it does, it near entirely forecloses the possibility of successfully
applying the doctrine of unilateral mistake.
First, this narrow reading assumes the relationship between the
programmer and the contracting party is entirely separate, when the
development of the algorithm is a byproduct of communication
between both parties. An issue with the formal language instrument
within a smart contract “stack” is the challenge in ensuring consistency
between the formal language used by a programmer within the
instrument and the natural language understandings of what that formal
language is meant to accomplish.96 In the context of programmers
acting on behalf of a separate party, these natural language
understandings are not those of the programmers themselves, but rather
the separate party on whose behalf they are creating the program.97 This
relationship mirrors the relationship between conventional transaction
lawyers and the parties on whose behalf they draft traditional human
language contract instruments. Similarly limiting the inquiry to the
knowledge and intentions of the lawyer who drafted instruments rather
than inquiring into the intentions of the contracting client would
produce absurd results. In both circumstances, the approach appears to
frustrate the court’s pursuit of determining and enforcing the parties’
intent by excluding a party from the inquiry. Thus, while a
deterministic program may be limited to “only do what the programmer
has programmed it to do,”98 the relevant inquiry must also include what
the programmer was told by the contracting party to do.
Further, even if no relationship exists between the contracting
party and the programming, the sole consideration of the programmer’s
knowledge and motivations would foreclose near any possibility of
successfully applying the doctrine of unilateral mistake. Such a
relationship may arise in instances where an “off the rack” smart
95
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contract solution is developed from consumer use. In such instances,
the programmer may never have any sense of another party’s mistaken
belief, let alone actual knowledge of them. Mistaken parties, however,
may be able to find some relief in the form of unilateral mistake in
equity. Under that approach, a court could theoretically find that a
remote programmer had constructive knowledge that their program
would be used to capitalize on a generalized party’s mistaken belief,
and if the non-mistaken party’s conduct was unconscionable, the
contract is voidable in equity. However, such an approach is narrower
than the traditional alternative under common law and may not produce
consistent results as it might under law.99 Further, it does not address
the effective elimination of the common law defense in such situations.
Instead, even where no prior relationship exists between the
programmer and the non-mistaken party, the courts should inquire into
the contracting party’s state of knowledge. Such an approach would
allow the doctrine of unilateral mistake to attach in situations where a
program operated as it was programmed to but at the hands of a
contracting party who sought to use it to take advantage of the other
party’s mistaken belief.
While Singapore’s highest court noted that the contracting
parties at issue and Quoine did not know that the specific trading
contracts would be entered into or what specific terms they would
contain,100 the court takes for granted that contracting parties
manifested their willingness to contract when they entered into
agreements with Quoine to trade on the platform. More specifically,
the court ignores the parties’ involvement in the choice of using the
specific algorithm. In the present case, the proprietary nature of the
algorithms collapses the inquiry because the programmer’s knowledge
mirrored that of B2C2 generally. However, had B2C2 used a generally
available algorithm rather than a bespoke one, a court limiting itself
only to the consideration of the programmer’s knowledge would omit
any consideration of why B2C2 chose that program over another, even
if that choice was to use it to take advantage of another party’s mistaken
belief.
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The inclusion of a threshold inquiry mirroring § 154 of the
Restatement (Second) on Contracts may improve the application of the
doctrine of unilateral mistake. Section 153 of the Restatement lays out
the requirements for the American doctrine of unilateral mistake:
Where a mistake of one party at the
time a contract was made as to a basic
assumption on which he made the
contract has a material effect on the
agreed exchange of performances that
is adverse to him, the contract is
voidable by him if he does not bear
the risk of the mistake under the rule
stated in § 154, and
(a) the effect of the mistake is such
that enforcement of the contract
would be unconscionable, or
(b) the other party had reason to know
of the mistake or his fault caused the
mistake.101
This doctrine mostly mirrors the Singaporean approach (which in turn
mirrors the approach under English contract law) in its requirement that
the mistaken party’s belief is a fundamental component of the
contract.102 Notably, however, the American approach limits the
doctrine to situations where the mistaken party has not assumed the risk
of the mistake. Section 154 clarifies when these situations exist:
A party bears the risk of a mistake
when
(a) the risk is allocated to him by
agreement of the parties, or
(b) he is aware, at the time the
contract is made, that he has only
limited knowledge with respect to the
facts to which the mistake relates but
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treats his limited knowledge as
sufficient, or
(c) the risk is allocated to him by the
court on the ground that it is
reasonable in the circumstances to do
so.103
Comment A reiterates the general commitment to freedom of contract
underlying contract law and notes that the limitation serves to maintain
contracting parties’ risk allocation, even when a change in
circumstance “upset basic assumptions and unexpectedly affect the
agreed exchange of performances.”104
This threshold inquiry, however, requires some tailoring for
the context of machine-executed smart contracts. First, when assessing
allocation by agreement, courts should either not rely solely on the
digital instrument within the contract “stack” as the explicit assertion
of the agreement of the parties or should not rely on this prong
altogether. If they were to do otherwise, a non-mistaken party would
be able to submit the digital instrument’s execution as evidence of a
non-ambiguous agreement that allocates the risk to the mistaken party,
as was the case with the individual who was behind the 2016 DAO
attack.105 In the case of Hunter and Dakota, out of fear that the formal
language used to encode their instructions may be used against them,
such an approach may encourage parties like Dakota to spend their
digital instruments from the specter of any undesirable outcome,
however improbable. In the worst case, parties may avoid using smart
contracts altogether unless they can accomplish the nigh-impossible
task of accounting for every possible outcome. Thus, while this prong
may be easiest to administer, its adoption may be an overcorrection.
Instead, the threshold inquiry should focus on the second and
third prongs. As to the second prong, focusing on scenarios in which
the mistaken party has consciously ignored their limited knowledge
allows the court to separate cases where the deviation between a party’s
intentions and a smart contract’s execution warrants consideration
under the doctrine of unilateral mistake from those that do not. In the
case of B2C2 and Quoine, such a prong would clearly highlight that
Quoine assumed the risk of such trades.106
The Singapore International Commercial Court’s ruling
identified, among others, five “errors or omissions” that would have
103
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limited Quoine’s liability and would have demonstrated that it did not
intend to allocate the risk to itself.107 First, it failed “to incorporate an
exception message in its quoter program to alert Quoine to the fact that
it was not working.”108 Second, it failed “to incorporate a circuit
breaker in the Platform’s software to prevent trades when the order
book was empty.”109 Third, it failed “to incorporate a circuit breaker to
prevent orders at an abnormal price from being placed on the order
book.”110 Fourth, it failed “to ensure that, in the case of a force-closure,
the forced sales were only within a given price range.”111 And last, it
failed “to ensure that, in the case of a force-closure, only assets which
were actually held by a counterparty in its account at the time were the
subject of a market order.”112 The cumulative omission of these various
mechanisms that would otherwise have limited Quoine’s liability could
thus support the claim that in consciously failing to include them,
Quoine assumed the risk that the algorithm underlying its smart
contract would behave outside of its expectations.
For similar reasons as with the first prong, courts should not
implement this prong so as to require, explicitly or implicitly, that
parties wishing to use smart contracts to implement mechanisms to
address every possible outcome, lest they be accused of consciously
ignoring it. Instead, however, it could be used to import a reasonable
standard of precaution based on prevailing risk-limitation practices,
such as redundant sources of information and circuit breakers. Such an
interpretation would highlight for parties that the choice to forego any
mechanisms to cabin in the behavior of their smart contracts are liable
for their contracts’ execution, even when they deviate from the parties’
expectations. In other words, parties would be on notice that if they
plan to use smart contracts to “move fast,” they’re responsible for the
things they “break” along the way. While this interpretation would not
resolve all issues of risk allocation, it would however encourage parties
to focus on ensuring that the risk mitigation mechanisms they impose
are appropriately tailored.
Last, the third prong would provide courts with a mechanism
by which to assign the risk to a party when the other factors are not
illustrative. Comment D to § 154 provides that when using this prong,
the court “will consider the purposes of the parties and will have
recourse to its own general knowledge of human behavior in bargain
107
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transactions, as it will in the analogous situation in which it is asked to
supply a term . . . .”113 In this way, the third prong allows courts to
allocate the risk to a party where it is reasonable to do so for reasons
outside of the first two prongs.114 For example, where a smart contract’s
terms are silent as to which party bears the risk, and neither party
consciously ignored the risks within the agreement, the court can then
apply its collective experience with traditional contract to the general
circumstances of the case. While this approach does not delineate
specific factors the court should look at in applying this prong, applying
this prong only as a last resort limits the risk of uncertain application
while affording courts flexibility where they need it.
CONCLUSION
Despite the centrality of freedom of contract to modern
contract law, courts have grappled with the task of when to curb this
principle and instead allow a party to claim that a mistake occurred. As
smart contracts proliferate, however, so too does the risk that
discrepancies will arise between what a party intends and the result
produced by the machine-executable code underlying the contract. In
turn, as these parties claim the doctrine of mistake, courts must assess
where these discrepancies fit within traditional contract law. In the first
decision of its kind, the Singapore International Commercial Court and
the Court of Appeal of Singapore addressed this issue directly, and
while they reached the correct result, their self-imposed limitation of
considering only the knowledge and intentions of the programmer
behind the smart contracts goes beyond what is necessary. Further, a
threshold inquiry, offered by American contract law, may help to more
easily disambiguate circumstances in which a party using a smart
contract has assumed the risks associated with its execution, and when
a party has truly made mistakes with machines.
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